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PART TWO
The Appeals Process
THOMAS M. REAVLEY
THE PROBLEM IS US
Thomas M. Reavley is a Senior Judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Justice Reavley has served as Secretary of
State for the State of Texas, District Judge, 167th District, and as a
Justice on the Supreme Court of Texas. In addition,Justice Reavley has
taught classes as an adjunct professor at the University of Texas Law
School and lectures at Baylor University Law School.
My high school debate coach insisted that we memorize our debate
speeches, not only the opening affirmative speech but also the negative
speeches and even rebuttals. I suggested that we might do better by
responding to what had been said by the other side instead of repeating
a speech set in advance, but he told us that the pros and cons were pretty much the same, and that he was doing it the way it was supposed to
be done and the way he had always done it.
That. was my earliest recognition of error covered by- "the way it is
supposed to be done." Or "this is the way we do it" or "have always done
it." Well, sometimes we should change. Sometimes it is the wrong way.
Sometimes our way of doing things ceases to serve its purposes. But too
often we just go on repeating our errors despite the grief they bring.
That is what is happening in the courts of appeals.
Lawyers think that they are supposed to write long "scholarly" briefs,
complaining about every conceivable error of the trial judge, immersed in
lots of law and citations of authority.
Judges think that we are supposed to write-for publication-"scholarly" opinions relating all of the background of the cases and
discussing all the arguments of the lawyers, buttressed by lots of law and
citations of authority.
Law schools have been teaching beginners to find as many legal issues
as possible in any controversy. For each and every issue they are taught
that excellence requires an exhaustive exposition of every case of similar
facts in the books. Lawyers go all through their careers thinking that this
is what legal advocacy is supposed to be.

It is a great sport. Lawyers display their advocacy skills and inflate
their fees, and may even hide the real issues of the controversies so as to
prevail when not entitled to do so. More and more judges and law clerks
are needed. And the academics have loads to play with.
But our gain is at a cost to the clients and to the public purse. I respectfully suggest that the time has come to jettison most of that baggage in the interest of clients and the administration of justice.
What lawyers, judges, and academics think is supposed to be the way
to do their business can no longer be afforded.
We hear a great cry raised across the country about the crisis of the
courts, oppressive dockets, and the loss of justice. I respectfully suggest
that there is indeed a crisis in doing things the same way they have been
done. But that is what is in peril, not justice.
We simply need to change.
Lawyers must learn to focus precisely on the dispositive issues, the
controlling evidence and legal precedent. All of the frivolous argument
and obfuscation must be banished. If the lawyer cannot state her position without pomp and cookery, she cannot expect to prevail.
Court of appeal judges will not comb the record on their own to determine if they agree with the trial court's judgment. They will take the
facts as found or assumed and lay the precise objection of the attorney
alongside. Then the judge will write a succinct statement of what is decided. Only rarely is publication justified. If not published, only a few
pages are needed. The judgment is affirmed-or reversed-or modified,
for the following reasons-one, two, three."
The decision should be a public record. It can be on-line for computer
retrieval. But is should not be added to the West Reporter mountain or
be a candidate for string citations. It should demonstrate the appellate
judge's consideration of the arguments advanced by the parties. Sometimes an incomprehensible petition can best be disposed of by a word,
and often the appellate panel need only adopt the reasons stated by the
trial court; but usually the reasons for the decision should be announced.
There are those who lament the passing of the long, scholarly opinion
fitting the "Learned Hand model." There are, of course, cases that come
to the courts of appeal calling for full-dress traditional treatment. But
these are very rare, and they would be more likely to receive their deserved treatment, without unacceptable delay, if the judges were not
spending so much time doing what is thought to be required by tradition
but what is actually habit and what is still said to be the way it is supposed to be.
I have been a federal court of appeals judge for about eighteen years. I
have been a senior judge for almost seven years, during which time I
have worked with almost all of the other circuits. And I can tell you that

[VoL 24: 887, 1997]

Symposium on Civil LitigationReform
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

we are wasting an enormous amount of time and money by following our
old habits.
I have reviewed the last four sessions of court in which I participated
during 1996. To prepare for those oral arguments I read over 7000 pages
of briefs in the eighty-eight appeals. The appellants had conceivable
cause for complaint in only forty-nine of the appeals, but there was no
arguable merit in thirty-nine of the appeals. I received no help from any
of the oral arguments. They played no part in my decision. I concede
that thirteen oral arguments were interesting and may have contributed
to the process of decision by the other two judges. Only thirteen. That
justified no more than two days of hearings, instead of four weeks. And
yet three judges, giving a full month each, cost the government over
$50,000 in travel expenses.
The fact of the matter is that almost all oral arguments benefit the
lawyers, but not the judges. This has been true in American courts for a
long time. Lawyers have a vested interest in the oral argument, giving
them more fees and praise of performance. Old habits die
hard-especially when they are profitable. Most judges and lawyers may
disagree with me on this, but it is my view of reality.
I recognize some merit in the view that public argument and exchange
between advocate and judge advances respect for the courts and regard
for the legitimacy of the judicial process on the part of the parties, and
maybe the public. Nevertheless, it is time to recognize the emperor's
nakedness. There are habits and luxuries that we can no longer afford.
Here is what court of appeal judges must do:
1. Discriminate, screen, prioritize between appeals. If an appeal deserves short shrift, give it that and no more. One judge can screen
out appeals with no arguable merit. After a one-paragraph order, a
second judge can take another look in response to a petition for
rehearing.
2. Recognize that the facts have been determined by the trial court
and that there is another higher court charged with law-making
authority. Usually, the intermediate court need only consider at the
outset whether the appellant has significant error to complain
about.
3. Recognize that the intermediate court is justified in writing a thorough discussion of legal issues in relatively few cases. And when
this is justified, it will be done much better, much sooner, and perhaps by the judge himself-if the other cases have been given no
more than their due.

4. Think about the consequences of delay and indecision. It would
help the litigants, the other judges on the panels, and the writing
judge as well, if judges would not sit on their decisions for months
and even years. This is inexcusable. If I dislike having to restudy a
case long after submission, when my colleague finally gets around
to writing, just think of the feelings of the parties.
5. Finally, add no more to the rules of law than is necessary. The law
should enable and not burden society. In these quiet, protected
chambers,we enjoy the opportunity to extrapolate endless rules and
exceptions for the lawyers and lesser souls to obey. Too many of us
cannot resist the opportunity. Just look at our contribution to guidelines sentencing or read First United Financial Corporation v.
USF&G1 or just thumb through the FederalReporter.
It is easy enough to play the numbers game-and to be distressed by
it. When Professor Baker wrote his book on the crisis in the courts of
appeal, he wrote that only the Ninth Circuit had more than 4000 new
appeals a year. I corrected him by pointing out that the Fifh Circuit that
year (1993) had 6696 new appeals. This year we will have 8000. And they
are building a new federal prison complex in East Texas that will house
26,000 prisoners. These are our best customers. Between thirty-five and
forty percent of the cases filed in federal courts come from prisoners.
Congress should provide that a certificate of appeal is required for an
appeal of any of these cases, as Congress has provided for habeas appeal. But the court need not wait on Congress. We just need to get out of
our ruts.
Here is my plan for the Fifth Circuit. Each judge would spend six
weeks out of the year in New Orleans-until we get teleconferencing.
But half of those weeks would be on Conference Calendar duty. The
staff attorneys would bring to a Conference Calendar panel the records
of all the new cases on hand, divided among the three judges, with written proposals for disposition. Record or legal questions would be turned
over to elbow clerks for prompt resolution. Problem cases would be
calendared for oral argument. The Conference Calendar would complete
its work that week. Cases orally argued would be decided by opinion
before the writing judge served on another argument panel.
Lawyers must change too, I repeat. Before you file your brief, elinminate the lard and the fussing and the obfuscation and the frivolous. Focus your writing on the controlling law and evidence. Either state your
position so the judge cannot miss it, or concede the judgment.
I will give you an example of what I am talking about. There was a
wrongful death suit against the United States under the Federal Tort

1. 96 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Claims Act Doctors of the Veterans Administration misdiagnosed the deceased, told him he had a hernia, to lose weight to have it operated.
Actually, he had a benign tumor in his colon that eventually caused the
colon or appendix to burst. He barely survived that problem, but blood
transfusions he received contained the HlV virus that led to AIDS and
then to his death. Negligent misdiagnosis was conceded. At the trial before the judge the only issue was whether the negligence and delay proximately caused the blood transfusion.
The trial judge dictated a twenty-three page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It was not well organized and was confusing at some
points. There was some disagreement among the doctors about the site
of the perforation, but the judge found that it was the appendix that
perforated and not the colon. The plaintiffs received a judgment of some
$700,000.
The Government appealed and filed a brief of twenty-eight pages in
which the writer hid the ball. He described the expert testimony for the
plaintiff as attributing the perforation to the colon and not the appendix,
and argued-incorrectly-that no expert testified to a probable causal
connection between the obstruction and the perforation of the appendix.
The plaintiffs lawyer filed a thirty-two page brief that failed to uncover
the ball. The first five pages were devoted to the poor treatment of the
deceased by the VA doctors, a fact not at issue. Next came an irrelevant
discussion of the conflict on the site of the perforation. Then, of course,
came lots of law. Finally, in the middle of the brief, the lawyer wrote a
fuzzy summary of the medical testimony that the obstruction blocked the
appendix, causing it to become infected and to burst, causing the peritonitis, requiring the transfusion that caused the death. His summary was
not nearly so simple as I have just stated it.
A very simple case. Clearly a judgment supported by the evidence. But
you might not know it from reading the briefs. And the court of appeals
judge who got the case on the summary calendar wrote an opinion reversing the judgment. Fortunately, the next judge on the summary panel
chose to let the case be argued. I was on the oral argument panel The
argument shed no more light than the briefs did. But I read the record
and, seeing ample support for the findings, affirmed. It was an excellent
example of what ails us, and I assure you that this is not an unusual
story.
In the best of all worlds appellate judges would read the complete trial
record in every case they decide. I was on a court of last resort for nine
years, and I did that in every case for which I wrote an opinion. But this

is impossible for the judges of the courts of appeal with their present
dockets. Lawyers must understand what this means, stop writing law
school exam answers and rambling argument, and make the point.
Goethe wrote: "New occasions teach new duties." The shibboleths of
yore and the assumptions, blithely assumed because they have been so
long supposed, may be false or useless today.
Our profession and system for the delivery of justice give us reasons
to be proud and grateful. You ought to go to Beijing or Moscow and take
a look at the problems countries face when they lack good lawyers and
legal processes. We are blessed. But we also have many serious problems
that need fixing. Both criminal and civil justice systems suffer from the
everlasting fine tuning by our champions of esoterica, the rulemakers
who imagine that they are working toward perfection in the grand edifice
of the law but who are actually undoing social order because the people
cannot cope with so grand an edifice.
This profession needs to do a lot of rethinking, and the turn of the
millennium is a good time to do it.

THOMAS E. BAKER
Thomas E. Baker is the Alvin R. Allison Professor at Texas Tech Law
School where he teaches ConstitutionalLaw and FederalCourts. Professor Baker authored a book entitled Rationing Justice on Appeal: The
Problems of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which reviews the history of the
courts, describes the present situation in the courts, and offers proposals for change.
Professor Baker Following Judge Reavley is almost impossible. He's a
federal judge, of course, and he has the credibility of a methodist bishop.
In fact, when the invitation came to my house for this conference, I
showed it to my wife, and she was all excited and enthusiastic about the
trip. I said, "Why, because of the importance of the program and subject
matter?"
"No, no."
"Because of the prominence of Pepperdine University?"
"No."
"A Malibu trip in winter?"
"No."
"Well, why? Why are you so excited about this program?"
And she looked and she pointed to his name and she said, "Because
Judge Reavley is going to be there. I like him better than I like you."
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I have tried to impress the judge before and not succeeded. I wrote a
450-page book and he was kind enough to write a review of it He dismissed my book with this one sentence that rd like to read to you: He
said, "If we are facing failure in our assignment, corrections by Congress
and the judges are at hand and should silence the alarm bells."' And
then he wrote a very kind review and went on to discuss my book.
It's also difficult to follow him orally because he just explained that
whatever I can say to him orally will not change his mind.
But ru try. I'll try.
I was trying to figure out a way to make this interesting to a group of
law students that I knew were going to be in the audience as well as
distinguished lawyers and others. I could not figure out a way to make
judicial administration interesting. I thought maybe I could try to make it
funny, but I knew that would be impossible. So I resorted to technology
and did some research on the Internet I cranked up my Netscape browser and by some curious surge or something (I'm not sure I understand
the technology), the screen went blank Netscape 2020 came up on the
screem Never has this happened before or since. I was able to download
a copy of the Chief Justice's Year-End Report for the year 2020.
I don't have time to read the entire Year-End Report and that would be
deadly dull, but I'd like to highlight just a few of the interesting developments that the Chief Justice of the United States in the year 2020 describes in this Year-End Report looking back on the future that we are
looking forward to.
It begins with a startling announcement that the Chief Justice is retiring as Chief Justice at the end of the October term 2020. By the way, if
there are any members of the media present, note on the cover that this
is embargoed and you cannot report on this until Thursday, January 1,
2021.

(Laughter.)
Judge Reavley. Everything I said is embargoed.

(Laughter.)
Professor Baker. He's even funnier than me.
So the Chief Justice announces this retirement will be effective at the
end of the October term 2020 and goes on to congratulate Justice

1. Thomas K. Reavley, Book Review, 26 TEX. TEcH. L REv. 271, 271 (1995) (reviewing THOMAS E. BAKEn, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL- THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS (1994)).

Antonin Scalia on his eighty-sixth birthday and says, "Without fear of
contradiction that the 'Energizer Dissenter,' as he is affectionately
known, will go on and on, beating his drum for many terms to come."
The Chief Justice's Report then touches on a new procedural development that I thought was very interesting. It's called the Writ of
Reinhardt. Judge Reavley just served on a panel with Stephen Reinhardt.
Apparently, in the future, the Supreme Court will designate a list of
circuit judges by name so that every decision or opinion written by the
judge on that list will be automatically vacated and remanded.
But to be serious for a moment, the Year-End Report talks about the
first two decades of the twenty-first century. And here, I think, is a
glimpse ahead to what the federal courts in our nation are facing in
terms of demographics, civil caseload growth, criminal caseload growth,
and federalization.
The Chief Justice first says that in the area of demographics, the population has increased by thirty million people, and because the basic
workload of the federal courts is a function of population, the caseload
in the judicial workload has grown apace. Further, because of the aging
of the "Baby-boomer" generation, more cases and more issues involving
the elderly have been pressed on the courts.
There is a vague reference to the Social Security Crisis of 2011. I'm not
sure what that is about
On the subject of civil docket growth, the Report says that, according
to differences in birthrates and immigration among racial groups, proportional increases in the percentages of non-white ethnic and racial
groups also affect the future of the courts. Our future, the Chief Justice's
past. The transition from a smokestack economy to a silicon chip society
has had a consequent increase in litigation.
The Report goes on to describe the factors that have grown the civil
caseload: Extensions of civil rights and antidiscrimination policies; expansion of mass tort litigation; deconstructive tendencies to extend malpractice theories to areas of education, religion, and government; and
finally, general litigiousness that increases between the years 2000 and
2020.
The criminal docket also grows according to the Year-End Report. It
increases in the first two decades of the next century because of a legislative tendency towards criminalization and a proclivity of prosecutors in
the executive branch to prosecute more.
According to the Year-End Report, the forty-year long "War on Drugs"
has also contributed to the oppressive dockets in the District Courts.
But the most important development for federal court workload in the
near future is what is called in the Year-End Report "federalization."
Federalization of the law. More and more areas of law traditionally con-
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sidered state law have been federalized, and that workload has been
added to the federal courts. There's reference to a national health care
program and a Federal Products Liability Act in terms of adding some
80,000 cases a year to the District Courts' dockets. The Chief Justice
expresses concerns in the following words: "The Third Branch always
has and always will depend on 'the kindness of strangers,'2 in the legislative branch.... But Congress must not practice deficit jurisdiction. The
number of judges and the resources of the judicial branch must remain
equal to the demands on the court system." Then there's a reference under a heading of Judicial Independence apparently to some sort of impeachment proceeding against Circuit Judge Dennis Rodman of the Court
of Appeals for Chicago.
The United States Court of Appeals, though, is the focus of an entire
part of this Year-End Report, and the Chief Justice's Report lists some
sixteen different studies, almost all having to do with the Courts of Appeals and recommending some sort of change or reform of those courts.
In fact, the Report refers to a new commission, still one more study, the
2020 Commission-not to be confused with the television show-the
2020 Commission on Federal Court Structure, popularly named the Baker
Commissiom
The Baker Commission delivered in the year of this Report a 200-page
final report entitled Courts to Congress: Just do it! The Chief Justice
echoes that plaintive plea to say something has to be done about this
"mega-crisis-to use the phrasing of the Report-mega-crisis of caseload
and the creation of more and more judges to meet caseload. According
to this document, by the year 2020, there are 2000 circuit judges and
400,000 appeals.
But more importantly, the Chief Justice expresses concern with the
rate of appeal, the ratio between the number of terminations in the District Court, and the number of cases that are present on appeal. Between
1950 and the year 2000 that ratio went from 1:40 to 1:8, and extrapolating
to the middle of the next century, to the year 2050, it could suggest that
one out of every two-fifty percent of everything the District Courts
do-ends up on a Court of Appeals docket.
But there are certainly good things to talk about in the future according to the Chief Justice's Report, and those are procedural innovations.

2. "Whoever you are-I have always depended on the ldndness of strangers." TENNFSSEE WiuiA M, A STRELmrAR NAMED DESIRE act 3, sc. 11 (1947) (quoting character of
Blanche DuBois).

Innovations like the Summary Calendar which is a non-argument calendar. Those appeals screened onto that calendar are decided without oral
argument. And, in fact, that started back in 1979. By the 1990s, about half
the cases are decided without oral argument. In the future that is reduced to one in ten. And the Chief Justice proposes to abolish oral argument altogether, which I suppose we would have to call the Reavley
Proposal after this morning.
Decisions without opinions are another innovation of the old Fifth
Circuit back in the 1970s. Again by the year 2020, opinions are written in
no more than one-quarter of the appeals brought nationwide, and the
proposal of the Chief Justice is to abolish opinions altogether. One point
in favor of the Chief Justice's position to abolishing written opinions in
federal appeals is that it would eliminate the problem of inner-circuit
conflicts, because we won't know if there were any conflicts. The Chief
Justice's Report emphasizes that it is time to free ourselves from this
formalistic ritual that dates back to before there were computers. The
written opinion should be done away with.
There's also a section in the report on staff attorneys and law clerks.
Fortunately, circuit judges have held that to a 5:1 ratio, four elbow clerks
and one staff attorney at the headquarters-although apparently in the
future some Courts of Appeals judges are experimenting with the position of a law clerk's law clerk.
Professor Richman: Externs.
Professor Baker. In those courts, the law clerks have been renamed
"sub-judges" and the law clerks to the sub-judges are called "parajudicials."
There's lots of technology reported in the future. As you might expect,
home pages in the Internet, virtual oral arguments, e-mail linkages for
briefing, and the rest.
One interesting future development is a prototype software program
nicknamed "Judge Dread," in which lawyers from both sides will respond
to a series and sets of questions, each subsequent set of questions being
generated by the previous set until the computer program develops an
affirmed or reversed recommendation to the judge. But the judging will
always be done by the humans.

(Laughter.)
Judge Reavley: Not the clerks.
(Laughter.)
Professor Baker. Not the clerks.
And so these are the new traditions that have replaced old traditions.
The Chief Justice singles out especially two innovations and recommends
them to other Courts of Appeals that I want to highlight from this YearEnd Report.
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The first is from the United States Court of Appeals for Las Vegas
where the judges have developed the "Coin-Toss Calendar." A case is
screened onto this calendar if it satisfies certain criteria. If the appeal
presents issues that are unimportant or uninteresting to the judges and it
appears that determining the correct outcome will just take too much
time, considering what is at stake for the party-litigants, maybe some
prisoner, then the case is scheduled for an appellate appearance before
an appellate magistrate who is equipped with a coin specially cast for the
occasion with the seal of the court on each side. One side says "Affirmed," and the other side says "Reversed." And justice is done.
Professor Richman: Both sides could say "Affirmed"
(Laughter.)
Professor Baker. There's no complaint about delegation to law clerks.
We save the judges time, and it formalizes and legitimizes a practice that
court-observers have actually attributed to judges.
The second interesting development, a pilot program, comes from the
United States Court of Appeals for Atlantic City which has developed an
ingenious procedure they refer to as a "Scratch-an-Appeal." These are
used in social security cases, prisoner civil rights cases, habeas corpus
cases, and other sorts of unimportant cases. A statistical analysis revealed a low percentage of reversals anyway in those categories that did
not correlate with any fact pattern or principle of law. They resembled
Jungian black-box decisions anyway.
So the clerk of the court developed an agreement with the same company that provides "scratch-off" game cards for the New Jersey state
lottery. When an appeal is presented-and these are very tastefully done
now-they have the figure of Justice with the scales of justice on the
front and the legend bears "U.S. Court of Appeals for Atlantic City
Scratch-an-Appeal." There would be full color printing and no tampering
or counterfeiting problems. In these designated categories of appeals, the
clerk takes the next card from a secure dispenser, puts a docket number
on it and mails it to the appellant with instructions to use a key or a coin
to scratch away the scales of justice and reveal the outcome in that appeal, "Affirmed" or "Reversed." In fact, the Court of Appeals for Atlantic
City is already thinking of expanding this program to develop a separate
card for all cases with pro se appellants, whose litigation proclivities, the
Chief Justice says, somewhat mirror a compulsive gambler.
The key to the program, according to the Chief Justice, is that the
reversal rate is set at ten percent, which is a better payout than most

state lotteries and a higher rate of reversal than courts usually give in
these cases.
But, again, the Chief Justice emphasizes that even with all these savings of judge time and judicial resources, the press of the cases continues and the Report describes a kind of breakthrough in the supply and
demand of federal appellate judgeships.
The Circuit Judgeship Parity Act of the year 2000. You may know from
your federal court history that omnibus judgeship bills are traditionally
the captives of divided government When the White House and the Congress are in different parties, it's rare to have judgeships created. But
there was this judicial miracle, the Chief Justice calls it, in the year 2000
that transferred authority to create circuit judgeships to the Judicial
Conference under a docket-based formula and to maintain a parity between the filings and the judges on the courts. And therefore judicial
gridiock was overcome while maintaining generalized courts. Although,
of course, the number of judges has doubled roughly every ten years to
the present complement of 2000 in the year 2020.
The other consequence for the future, according to the Year-End Report, is that the circuits, the geographical circuits with which we're very
familiar, have been obliterated. The nineteenth century geographical
organization is gone by the year 2020. First you will remember the 1981
decision of the old Fifth Circuit and that proved to be a harbinger of,
things to come. The old Ninth Circuit, according to the Report, was divided immediately to create the Twelfth Circuit But then when no court
wanted to become the Thirteenth Circuit out of judicial triskaidekaphobia, Congress renamed all of the different courts of appeals after their
headquarters city. So the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was
renamed the U.S. Court of Appeals for New Orleans. And so this process
continued according to the Report until reaching the stable configuration
of 154 separate circuit courts of appeals and 2000 circuit judges.
But there have been important criteria in dividing circuits identified by
the Baker Commission. First, a circuit should be composed of at least
three zip codes. Second, no circuit should be created that will not require at least nine judges. Third, a circuit should contain neighborhoods
with a diversity of population, legal, business, and socioeconomic interests. Fourth, realignment should not depend on preexisting alignments.
Fifth, the circuits should be as contiguous as is possible. But again, dividing circuits did not affect the workload because it does not change the
ratio of judges and appeals or the ratio of judge work to judges.
The Report ends to talk and to praise the evolved federal Courts of
Appeals, the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the year 2020, with the rhetorical
question, "What does it matter if it takes 2000 judges today to decide
400,000 appeals?" Here I quote: "We have arrived at the modem appellate
wisdom that it is more important that an appeal be decided than that it
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be decided rightly." And so appellate procedures are a means towards an
end. Nothing more, nothing less. What is essential is that the appeal-asof-right has been preserved in the face of that long-term docket growth.
The Chief Justice closes the Report with a personal postscript describing the fact that in the year 2020, as the nation begins the third decade of
that new century, that it would be appropriate to build a foundation of
the bridge to the twenty-second century. And here the Chief says: "That
was one of President Clinton's favorite metaphors back when he appointed me Chief Justice. I want to conclude by expressing my heartfelt
thanks to him for providing me this opportunity for judicial service under
the Constitution, made possible in no small part by his full and unconditional pardon. He has been a wonderful helpmate and life's partner." The
Report is signed, "Hillary Rodham Clinton," Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM M. RicHMN

RATIONING JUDGESHIPS HAS LOST ITS APPEAL
William M. Richman is a professor of law at the University of Toledo
College of Law. ProfessorRichman currently teaches, among other subjects, Judicial Administration and Jurisprudenceand has recently coauthored an article in the Cornell Law Review titled Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition.

I.

INTRODUCTION'

The federal circuit courts have changed radically in the last twenty-five
years in response to an overwhelming increase in caseload. For most of

1. For a more in-depth discussion, see William M. Richman & William L Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorar Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNEa L REv. 273 (1996).

their one-hundred year history, the judges heard oral arguments and
wrote fully reasoned, published opinions in nearly all cases. Today, those
time-honored procedures are sadly truncated. Now, fewer than half the
circuit courts hear oral argument in at least half of the cases they decide.
Traditionally the norm, a fully reasoned precedential opinion today accounts for less than a third of all case terminations. Further, the judge
now operates not as an isolated artisan, but rather as the manager of a
team of clerks and staff attorneys whose role is to conserve judicial effort by screening cases and participating significantly in the opinion writing and decision-making processes. Law clerks have trebled in the last
thirty years; and central staff, unknown thirty years ago, now outnumber
judges in most circuits.
Not only is judge time rationed, but the key decisions allocating the
judges' efforts are not even made by the judges. Clerks and central staff
screen the appeals to determine how much judge time to allocate to each
case and recommend whether oral argument should be granted and
whether a full opinion (or, indeed, any opinion) should be written. Thus,
an effective right to appeal error to the circuit courts no longer exists; instead, litigants must petition the staff to obtain access to the judges. In
short, despite their statutory and historical role as courts of appeals, the
circuit courts have become certiorari courts.
These developments have had other unfortunate consequences as well.
First, the overall quality of the work of the circuit courts has declined
markedly. The reduction is most obvious in the opinions; more than half
are unpublished, and a substantial portion fail the most minimal standards. Somewhat less obvious are the effects of curtailing argument and
the proliferation of para-judicial personnel. To see this effect, it is important to remember that the courts' work product is not simply correct
appellate decisions, but also the appearance of deliberative justice meted
out in fair proportion to all litigants. Reductions in oral argument damage
this product by depriving litigants of the assurance that the judges have
paid some personal attention to their cases. The proliferation of appellate
bureaucracy only exacerbates the problem, leading litigants to suspect
that the staff, not the judges, have made the decision.
Second, and perhaps more important, the transformation has created
different tracks of justice for different cases and different litigants, a
practice that threatens the judges' ability to fulfill their oath to "administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor
and to the rich .... "2In an "important" case, perhaps in a major securities matter, the judges play a very active role: they listen to oral argument, work hard preparing opinions that are circulated among and read

2. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1994).
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carefully by their colleagues, and ultimately have the final opinion published to serve as a precedent.
In contrast, in a "routine" case (an appeal of a denial of social security
benefits, for example), central staff may read the briefs, recommend
against oral argument, and prepare a draft opinion. The judge's own
clerks then scan the reports from central staff to see if they should be
followed. In these cases, actual judge time probably consists of limited
review of the staff recommendations. The draft opinion is not published,
and sometimes no opinion (other than a brief affirmation) is issued at all.
Exacerbating the problem of two-track justice is its unequal administration. The burdens of the change fall disproportionately on the poorest
and least powerful federal litigants because theirs are the "trivial" cases:
social security litigation, civil rights cases, pro se appeals, and prisoner
petitions. The standard explanation for different tracks of justice is that
some cases are more "important" than others because the economic
stakes are higher or the legal problems more complex or more pervasive,
but that explanation misses the point. The basic guarantee of justice to
all in equal measure suffers under any regime that allocates justice differently according to the wealth and sophistication of the litigants.
These developments are a direct consequence of an increase in caseload that has far outstripped the increase in the number of judges. Yet
the transformation was not inevitable. The Judicial Establishment has
steadfastly resisted the one obvious solution: to ask Congress for a radical increase in the number of judges. The Judicial Establishment has
advanced various reasons for such resistance, despite well-known data
and arguments to the contrary. Other reasons for the resistance are the
judges' desires to preserve the elite status of a small judiciary and to
replicate the comfortable role they enjoyed at the apex of a career in
practice or at the academy.
The transformation of the federal appellate courts into certiorari
courts has not taken place by design but has been the by-product of the
effort to maintain a small, elite federal judiciary. The size of the tool has
dictated the size of the job, rather than the other way around. Moreover,
the transformation has gone largely unnoticed and virtually without debate in the larger legal community. This symposium panel is an important step in launching that debate.

B.

The Arguments
1. Quality Candidates

Some opponents of expansion argue that increasing the number of
judgeships would vastly reduce the quality of the bench. In its purest
form (that there are not enough good candidates to fill the additional
judgeships) the argument is hard to take seriously. Increasing circuit
judgeships by 100 would result in a 3000-to-one ratio of lawyers to circuit
judgeships. Surely of every 3000 lawyers in this country, there is one
qualified, willing, and able to fill a circuit judgeship. Narrowing the field
considerably, there are over 600 district judges, about 800 state appellate
judges, over 5000 law professors, and countless senior partners, prosecu-.
tors, public defenders, and state and federal administrative lawyers; surely that group could produce 100 distinguished candidates for the circuit
courts.
A variation of the argument asserts that increases in judgeships will
reduce the prestige of the position and thus diminish the pool of distinguished candidates. No empirical evidence supports thus bald assertion,
however. Indeed, the limited evidence available suggests the opposite.
Circuit judgeships have not become less sought after as their number has
tripled since 1950, nor is there a dearth of fine applicants for the 649
district court judgeships.
Another variation asserts that an increase in judgeships will reduce the
scrutiny of each appointment, permitting the political process to forward
and confirm mediocre candidates. With respect to congressional scrutiny,
the argument comes too late. Judges are confirmed in groups and hearings are pro forma There is no empirical support for the argument that
increases in judgeships will reduce other forms of scrutiny;, and the limited evidence that exists suggests the opposite. There has been no noticeable reduction in scrutiny or quality as the circuit bench has tripled, in
the last fifty years, nor do we know of variations in scrutiny and quality
between the First Circuit with six judges and the Ninth with twentyeight Further, if increases would dilute quality and scrutiny, there is no
indication of the relevant numbers or proportions. For all we know, a
1000% increase in judgeships might have a substantial impact on scrutiny
and quality, while an increase of 10096 (the largest suggested so far)
might have none. These questions have never been investigated, nor even
seriously posed.
The quality-of-the-bench argument suffers from an even more serious
flaw. It focuses on the quality of the active circuit judges-not on the
quality of the appellate justice dispensed. The two are different because
circuit judges are responsible for only a part of the work of the circuit
courts, the remainder falling to visiting judges, law clerks, and central
staff attorneys. A substantial increase in the number of judgeships would
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reduce improper delegation and increase the odds that every case on the
docket would receive the personal attention of the judges. Thus, even if
expansion reduced the quality of the average circuit judge, it would still
increase the overall quality of appellate justice.
2.

Expansion is Too Expensive

Opponents of additional appellate capacity rely on the cost of new
judgeships, citing $800,000 as the cost of each new position. The 100 new
judgeships needed thus entail an annual expenditure of about $80 million. But large numbers can be understood only through comparisons.
The federal government spends only two-tenths of one percent of the
federal budget on the entire federal judiciary-$2.6 billion out of the total
$1.4 trillion.3 The $80 million required for 100 new judgeships in turn

amounts to less than three percent of the $2.6 billion judiciary budget,
and thus about one two-hundredth of one percent of the federal budget.
Comparisons to other federal expenditures are also revealing. The
franking privilege for members of Congress costs about $60 million per
year'; the National Gallery of Art, about $50 million; price support payments to wool and mohair producers, about $180 million6 ; and more
than forty universities receive over $70 million each in Federal Research
and Development Funds.7 These comparisons make it quite clear that
adding one hundred new circuit judgeships would not be a major expense either viewed as a fraction of the total budget, or by comparison
with other uses of federal dollars.
The argument suffers from a more crucial flaw. Even if the extra capacity were too expensive on some platonic scale, that is a reason for
Congress to refuse to create the judgeships-it is not a reason for the
judiciary to refuse to ask for them. Put somewhat differently, even
though Congress may refuse to fund a weapons system, the generals are
usually willing to ask for it. In the congressional funding game, each
budgetary supplicant emphasizes the paramount importance of its needs
to the national welfare, jockeying with the others to increase its slice of
the pie. It is then the job of Congress to choose among the competing

3. BuDGEr OF THE UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT, ANALYI1CAL PERSPECTIVES 104-06 tbl.

7-2 (1995).
4. Id. at 14-15.
5. BUDGET OF THE UNIrED STATES GOVERNMENT, APPENDIX 967 (1995).

6. Id, at 154.
7. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 611 tbl. 973 (1994).

claims. The budget process relies on the judiciary to inform Congress of
the resources needed to do the job-not to engage in self-censorship by
asking for only ten percent of the needed positions.
3. Too Much Precedent?
Opponents of increased appellate capacity have argued that expansion
will lead to instability in the law. According to this argument, if Congress
adds judgeships to existing circuits, the circuit courts will decide more
cases, and the law of the circuit will become muddled, which in turn,
will promote higher rates of appeal as losing litigants find it increasingly
worthwhile to "take their chances." Alternatively, Congress could add
more circuits, but anti-expansionists contend that doing so would increase inter-circuit conflicts, which already are too numerous for the Supreme Court to resolve.
a. No empirical evidence
The first of many problems with the instability-of-the-law argument is
that its crucial premises lack any empirical support. There simply is no
evidence that increasing the number of judgeships within a circuit reduces the stability of circuit law or increases the rate of appeal. Nor is
there any evidence that increasing the number of circuits will create a
serious problem of unresolved inter-circuit conflicts.
A Federal Judicial Center study reported that eighty percent of responding circuit judges and sixty-eight percent of responding district
judges believed that lack of clear circuit precedent was a small or nonexistent problem.' Further, in each group the percentage of judges expressing a concern did not correlate with circuit size.
Another useful study, commissioned by the Ninth Circuit and conducted by Professor Arthur Hellman, targeted inconsistency of circuit precedent and unpredictability of decisions.9 Helman examined a sample of
the published opinions of the Ninth Circuit and found little evidence of
intra-circuit conflict.0 Most examples of inconsistency that he did find
dealt with issues governed by fact-specific, multi-factor, or indeterminate
legal standards such as probable cause for an arrest, personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, or "rule of reason" cases.1 Professor Hellman
concluded that these issues were likely to cause unpredictability regard8. JuDrm A. McKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 93 (1993).

9. Arthur D. Heflman, Breaking the Bane: The Common-Law Process in the Large

Appellate Court, 23 ARM ST. L. 915 (1991).
10. Id, at 920.
11. Id. at 972.
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less of the number of applicable precedents and, therefore, regardless of
circuit size. 2
Hellman also examined separate dissenting and concurring opinions on
172 issues in the sample."3 His analysis led him to conclude that the
primary cause of unpredictable outcomes in the Ninth Circuit was not "a
plethora of circuit precedents that point in different directions," but rather the "absence of a circuit precedent that is closely on point or, less
commonly, a fact-specific rule... that by its nature requires case-by-case
evaluation." 4 These conditions, he concluded would "occur less often
in the large circuit because the larger number of decisions increases
the odds that there will be a precedent on point."' 5
Hellman's conclusion resonates powerfully with experience and common sense. The bitter truth, known to all who do any legal research, is
that there is not too much law, but rather too little. A glance at standard
treatises or casebooks in several areas reveals that many issues lack any
precedent at all, and that most of the decisional law comes from the
district courts.
A variation on the unstable law argument asserts that increasing the
number of circuit judges would create instability in the law of the circuit
and that this instability in turn would increase the rate of appeal. Proponents of this argument cite the five-fold increase in national appeal rates
that has accompanied the steady growth in appellate judgeships.
This argument is a classic example of a logical fallacy, post hoc ergo
propter hoc. During the last forty years, circuit judgeships have increased, but other changes in the federal appellate courts have also occurred. In that same period, for instance, the average height of circuit
judges (adjusted for gender) has increased. Absent some clear causal
mechanism, it makes no more sense to attribute accelerated appeal rates
to additional judgeships than to increased judicial altitude. Not every
correlation is a cause.
More enlightening is a comparison of current appeal rates in circuits of
various sizes. If the more-judges-creates-more-appeals argument is valid,
we should expect to see a relationship between circuit size and appeal
rates. In fact, however, rates of appeal seem to be unrelated to circuit
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size, suggesting that'increasing the size of the circuit bench is unlikely to
affect those rates.
In lieu of enlarging the existing circuits, Congress could create more
appellate capacity by creating new circuits. Opponents of this solution
see it merely as a trade of one kind of inconsistency for another, contending that inter-circuit conflicts will multiply far beyond the Supreme
Court's already inadequate capacity to resolve them.
Once again, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In a study commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center pursuant to congressional request, Professor Hellman investigated 142 inter-circuit conflicts that the
Supreme Court refused to hear in the 1984 and 1985 Terms. 8 Of these,
he found only forty that (a) had not been put to rest by subsequent decisions or legislation, (b) continued to generate litigation, and (c) controlled outcomes in reported cases. 7 Further, he noted that the Court
has ample room on its docket to resolve these conflicts."8 The study
shows not only that unresolved inter-circuit conflict is not a serious
problem, but also that the creation of several more circuits is not likely
to make it one.
b. Consistency v. capacity
Even if we assume that new judgeships will produce significant inconsistency, it sill does not follow that Congress should refuse to create
them. The logical leap from new-judgeships-increase-inconsistency to
create-no-new-judgeships is vulnerable to a powerful reduction ad absurdum attack If consistency is the paramount goal of the judicial process, and fewer judgeships mean more consistency, Congress should
reduce the number of authorized judgeships. Yet the consequences of
such a maneuver would be disastrous. Today the circuit courts can keep
current by giving full appellate process to only half their caseload and
handle the other fifty percent bureaucratically. If Congress reduced the
number of judgeships, even fewer cases would receive the traditional
appellate process, and correspondingly more would be handled bureaucratically. To push the absurdity even further, if fewer judgeships mean
greater consistency, why not have a single three-judge panel for the nation?
The answer, of course, is that consistency is not the only goal. At least
as important is adequate capacity. Thus, even if we assume (counterfactually) that expansion generates inconsistency, we have proved
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only that adequate capacity on the one hand and legal consistency on the
other are competing values that must be balanced against each other, not
that judgeships should be frozen at current levels.
In order to strike the proper balance, we would need to know much
more than we now know (or even presume to know) about the relationship between additional judgeships and legal inconsistency. In the absence of data on the purported correlation, the issue turns on the burden
of proof. That burden belongs on the opponents of expansion because of
the difference between known versus unknown costs and benefits. The
known benefit is the traditional appellate process which made the federal appellate courts great, and which could still survive if judgeships increased by adequate levels. We ought not give up the chance to retain it
without a very good reason. Avoiding losses in certainty and consistency
might qualify as a good reason if we could be sure they would occur and
we could know their orders of magnitude. It makes no sense, however,
to suffer the known evil of increased bureaucratization in return for a
completely speculative dividend of increased consistency.
c.

Mechanisms that enhance consistency

Even if we assume counterfactually that increased capacity leads inevitably to inconsistency and that consistency is the system's paramount
goal, it still does not follow that Congress should refuse to supply additional judgeships. There are numerous devices to safeguard consistency
without permanently limiting the nation's appellate capacity. Among
them are:
1. Better legislation: Congressional attention, both before and
after passage, to statutory issues that recurrently generate
litigation (e.g., preemption, retroactivity, limitations).
2. Subject matter specialized appellate courts or panels: These
can reduce inconsistency by decreasing the number of decision-makers in a particular area of law.
3. A fourth tier of courts: Another tier of courts between the
circuit courts and the Supreme Court could resolve inter-circuit
inconsistencies, thus permitting more circuits and allowing
each one to remain small enough to minimize intra-circuit inconsistency.
In order to use specialization or a four-tier pyramid to combat the
inconsistency that supposedly results from increased appellate capacity,
the court would need to abandon several cherished traditions such as the

small size and elite status of the federal judiciary, the historical role of
federal judges as generalists, the practice of allowing conflicts to "percolate" before they reach the Supreme Court, and the traditional conventions of circuit alignment As comforting and familiar as these traditions
are, however, they are also peripheral. Historically, the defining characteristic of the federal appellate courts has been that the judges did their
own high-quality work and the courts did not ration justice according to
the status of the litigants. That defining characteristic, of course, is in
serious jeopardy. If the cost of saving it is the abandonment of some
peripheral traditions, the price may be high, but it is certainly a worthwhile exchange.
Further, the loss of the peripheral traditions is inevitable anyway. As
caseloads continue to rise, the system will seek to accommodate by increasing the use of screening and triage, but there are political limits to
that solution. At some point Congress, the bench, the bar, and the public
will cease to tolerate a regime that screens sixty or seventy-five or ninety
percent of the cases out of the traditional appellate process. The only
alternative then will be to increase the number of judgeships. But if the
growth and inconsistency hypothesis is correct, the law within and
among the circuits will become incoherent, and structural
change--specialization of a fourth tier-will be required anyway. In the
end, both the peripheral and the central traditions of the federal appellate system will be lost.
4.

Loss of Collegiality

Adding judges, it is sometime argued, would reduce collegiality,
thereby impairing judicial quality. Little detail accompanies this objection, and for good reason. First, it is by no means clear that collegiality is
a function of small size, as famous feuds on the Supreme Court attest.
Second, collegiality on the modem circuit court is probably a myth anyway. One study of the Eighth Circuit, a relatively small court, for example, found that even among judges on a particular panel, "the
memorandum was the most frequently used means of communication." 9
Communication with off-panel judges was "not extensive," and communication involving track-two cases was nearly nonexistent
Even if collegiality were not a myth, it is difficult to see why it should
be valued so highly. Perhaps collegiality breeds efficiency, but it also
entails a cost. Judges who know and like each other might be less likely
to risk their relationship by disagreeing on matters of importance to one
or the other. Of course, collegiality does provide one clear benefit: pro-
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fessional life on a collegial court is more pleasant for the judges. The
courts, however, exist for the good of the nation, not the professional
satisfaction of the judges.
5.

Jurisdictional Retrenchment

Advocates of a small, elite federal judiciary have their own solution to
the problem of appellate overload-jurisdictional contraction. According
to them, if Congress would just return federal jurisdiction to the proper,
limited scope prescribed by the Constitution, history, and federalism, the
caseload of the federal courts would decrease enormously, and there
would be no need for significant expansion of the judiciary.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument, however, like the rest of the
court-capping rhetoric, is seriously flawed. The argument relies mainly on
tradition, but the historical record is anything but clear. The reach of
federal jurisdiction has changed repeatedly in response to evolving congressional appraisals of the need for federal solutions to social, political,
and economic problems. In the end, the scope of federal jurisdiction has
hinged less on theory and tradition and more on politics and expedience.
The thrust of the jurisdictional retrenchment argument is that large
expansions of the appellate judiciary will be unnecessary if Congress
exercises proper jurisdictional restraint Thus, the real issue is not
whether jurisdictional retrenchment is a good idea, but whether Congress
will do it. The prospects are bleak, to say the least. Even the most conservative reform proposals like those of the Federal Courts Study Committee have a knack for prompting spirited opposition, and as a result,
few have even been introduced in Congress, let alone adopted.
The more global admonition to Congress against continued federalization of the civil and criminal law is a pipedream. Congress "federalizes"
the law in response to powerful political forces, and the vision of an elite
federal judiciary, unsullied by cases based on improperly federalized
crimes and civil claims, has no constituency large, numerous, or powerful enough to oppose groups that favor particular federalizing legislation.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument is not only bad politics, it is
bad policy as well. Its fundamental error is to misconceive the function
of federal jurisdiction. The jurisdiction exists for the good of the country-not for the good of the federal courts. If Congress believes that
"federalizing" some area of the law will benefit the country by controlling
the drug problem or by protecting battered women, it is not merely
Congress's right, but its duty to pass such legislation, even though it
might discomfort the federal judges or require additional judgeships.

The size of the task should control the size of the tool, not vice versa.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument, however, reverses this crucial
priority. The argument starts with the premise of a small, elite federal
judiciary and then reasons that, because of its size, the courts should
have only a minimal core of federal jurisdiction. But surely Congress's
job is to approach the problem from the front end, first determining how
much federal legislation and federal jurisdiction the nation needs and
then supplying the federal courts with judgeships and other resources
equal to the task
IV. ELMSM
If judicial opposition to expansion cannot rest credibly upon the arguments usually advanced, are there other considerations that may help to
explain it? One motive is familiarity. The current generation of judges
has worked with the bureaucratic model of justice for their entire judicial careers, and there is a natural tendency to "view as appropriate that
which is familiar."' Practice on the new certiorari courts also permits
the judges to replicate their roles in practice, where they functioned
more as team leaders than as isolated artisans. The role of the modem
appellate judge, supervising elbow clerks, central staff, and legal extems
comfortably echoes the role of the senior practitioner, supervising the
work of junior partners, associates, and paralegals.
Another motive is probably quality of life. Judge Tjoflat writes that
"life as a judge on a jumbo court is comparable to life as a citizen in a
big city-life on a smaller court to life in a small town."2' Thus, "judges
in small circuits are able to interact with their colleagues in a more expedient and efficient manner than judges on jumbo courts."' Although this
image is attractive, reality is somewhat different, as the earlier discussion
of collegiality shows. The small town metaphor is also disturbing. It suggests that judges associate a "small town" existence with comfort, and
that sitting on a larger court would be less homey. But the comfort of
the judges is easily overvalued; again, the courts exist for the good of the
nation, not for the satisfaction of the judges.
Yet another reason for judicial reluctance to expansion is concern
about status. As then-Professor Frankfurter wrote long ago: "A powerful
judiciary implies a relatively small number of judges."' Others are even
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more explicit about the relation among size, status, and power. Justice
Scalia does not want a larger judiciary: "[I]t only dilutes the prestige of
the office and 'aggravates the problem of image." Fortunately, at least
some judges believe that concerns about comfort and status should not
control the way the circuit courts decide cases or motivate the judiciary's
advocacy for restricting its own size. Judge Reinhardt is brutal in his
candor.
We federal judges are simply unable to abandon our notion of the appellate courts
as small, cohesive entities operating in a pristine and sheltered atmosphere. It ap-

pears that, rather than surrender this wholly unrealistic and outdated vision of the
federal judiciary, many of us are willing to ration justice, to eliminate some of the
best qualities we once associated with appellate decisionmaldng, and to shut the

doors of the courts to the American people by severely restricting our jurisdiction.'
CONCLUSION

Congress established the United States Courts of Appeals to correct
error at the district court level, and for the first eighty years of their
existence, the circuit courts performed that function as a common law
appellate court should-visibly, collegially, personally, accountably, and
equitably. In nearly all cases--"important" and "trivial"-they heard oral
argument, conducted face-to-face conferences, personally wrote reasoned
opinions, and published those opinions, standing by their precedential
effect.
Beginning around 1970, the courts began to truncate the traditional
model to keep pace with an overwhelming increase in the volume of
cases. Today, many cases get no argument, no conference, and no written, published precedential opinion. Further, instead of the personal
attention of Article I judges, they receive bureaucratic treatment at the
hands of the central staff. Finally, the bifurcation often occurs along
class lines, wealthy, powerful, and institutional litigants receiving the
lion's share of the courts' limited resources.
The obvious solution to the problem is to create enough judgeships to
treat all cases in the traditional mode, but the Judicial Establishment has
opposed that solution vigorously, relying on an array of exceedingly
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weak arguments. Thus, there is no empirical support for the fear that
expansion will reduce the quality of the bench. The cost of new judgeships is not overwhelming compared to other federal expenditures; and if
it were, that would excuse only Congress's failure to supply the positions, not the judiciary's refusal to ask for them. According to the only
available empirical studies, expansion will not create legal instability;, and
even if it did, adequate capacity is at least as important as consistency.
The jurisdictional retrenchment argument is fantasy. Congress is not
about to make radical cuts in federal jurisdiction to accommodate the
judiciary's desire to remain small, nor should it; the size of the job
should dictate the size of the tool, not vice versa.
The superficiality of these anti-expansion arguments suggests, and
some judges candidly admit, that the desire to maintain collegiality and
prestige is a major reason for judicial opposition to expansion. There is
nothing intrinsically wrong with those goals; but shortchanging the litigants for the benefit of the judges is wrong. The courts exist for the
good of the nation, not the judges.

